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In early December, President Trump convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. His pledge was an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Shortly after, however, a starkly different strategy for instability emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, striking sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Strategic Pivot

These divergent actions encapsulates the central tenet of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on trade and conflict resolution—though how this squares with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative echoed this, commenting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Inconsistencies

This pivot is consequential, but experts note it is early to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a scholar for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research forecasts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Geopolitical Apathy and Friction

Differing from his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known comment on African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant disagreement has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Targeted Involvement

A similar standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the forceful rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” she added.